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I. INTRODUCTION
This session, the Nebraska Legislature will again be considering a
bill which, as introduced, gave the Nebraska Department of Correc-
tional Services (DCS) authority to contract with the private sector for
incarceration of those persons committed to the Department's cus-
tody.1 The purpose of this Comment is to familiarize the reader with
1. LB 612, 92nd Leg. 1st Sess., 1991 Nebraska Laws. The bill, as originally intro-
duced, was a very brief permissive grant of authority to the Director of the De-
partment of Correctional Services to contract directly with private parties outside
DCS "for the control and maintenance of persons committed to the department
...." To remedy possible constitutional deficiencies, the bill was later amended
by its introducer, Senator Wickersham, to provide, inter alia, that the Director of
DCS must have the "approval of the Legislature and the Governor" to enter into
contracts with private persons for the control and maintenance of persons com-
mitted to DCS. LB 612 was amended yet again by the Standing Committee on
Government, Military and Veteran Affairs prior to being advanced to General
File on March 25, 1991. As most recently amended by the committee, LB 612
gives the Director of DCS the authority to, "upon the approval of the Legislature
and the Governor, enter into long-term contracts with any person or political sub-
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some of the problems 2 posed by prison privatization in general and
point out possible constitutional obstacles facing privatization in Ne-
braska. Part II of this Comment provides background on the magni-
tude of today's prison crisis and presents arguments most commonly
propounded both for and against private prisons. Part III considers
possible constitutional hurdles to privatization in Nebraska, and sug-
gests private prison legislation may well be an unconstitutional dele-
gation of governmental authority. Part IV examines some of the
policy implications of prison privatization and submits it would be im-
prudent to view private prisons as an appropriate solution to the na-
tion's prison crisis. Part V explores the ideological propriety of private
prisons and concludes, even absent constitutional problems, the le-
gally-sanctioned restriction of prisoners' liberty must remain wholly
in public hands.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Magnitude of Today's Prison Crisis
The prisons of this country are in the midst of a profound crisis.
On a national level, the number of federal and state prisoners reached
an all-time high of 710,054 in 1989,3 an increase of 13.1% over the
division for the expansion, construction, or use of facilities under the jurisdiction
of the department .... " Standing Committee Amendment to LB 612, 92nd Leg.
1st Sess., (1991), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1274 (1991). Conspicuously
absent from the committee amendment is any language which would expressly
permit a private firm to maintain custody and control of prisoners. Arguably,
"use of facilities" could be broadly interpreted to allow for custody and mainte-
nance of prisoners by private firms, but it is not clear whether such an interpreta-
tion was intended.
LB 612 will appear on the floor of the legislature in 1992, where it is likely to
undergo further amendments and may once again expressly provide for private
custody and control of prisoners. In the meantime, the legislature will conduct
an interim study on the subject of prison privatization, with public hearings ex-
pected to be held sometime in the fall of 1991. L. Res. 136, 92nd Leg. 1st Sess.,
(1991), reported in LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 2265 (1991).
2. This Comment addresses the constitutionality and wisdom of prison privatization.
There are, of course, many important issues concerning private prisons which are
beyond the scope of this writing. For example, there are statutory and contrac-
tual issues, employee labor issues, issues surrounding private guards and the use
of deadly force and inmate issues which are not dealt with herein. A working
understanding of these issues is critical to avoidance of problems in the event a
state chooses to utilize private prisons, and the fact that these issues are not ad-
dressed in this Comment is not intended to indicate they are not matters about
which to be concerned. For an exhaustive treatment of these issues and compre-
hensive model legislation, see Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incar-
ceration, 38 Am. U.L. REV. 531 (1989).
3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BULLETIN ON PRISONERS IN
1989,1 (1989) [hereinafter BULLETIN ON PRISONERS]. A recent survey by The Sen-
tencing Project reports that in 1991 more than one million Americans were in jail
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number incarcerated in 1988.4 An alarming 274 of every 100,000 citi-
zens in this country were incarcerated in state or federal prisons in
1989,5 and the number continues to rise. The 82,466 inmates who were
added to federal and state prisons in 1989 translated into a nationwide
need for nearly 1600 new prison bedspaces per week.6 Forty-five
states and the federal prison system report operating significantly
above capacity,7 and as a result of this overcrowding almost half the
states have been forced to house a total of 18,236 prisoners in local jails
or other facilities.8 Making matters worse, prison systems in nearly
every state are under court order to reduce overcrowding9 yet the pub-
lic continues to demand more criminals be incarcerated and their
sentences lengthenedlo
or prison, either awaiting trial or serving a sentence. Lincoln Journal-Star, Jan.
5, 1992, at 2, col. 3. See also Lincoln Journal-Star, Nov. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
4. Id. The increase in the number of prisoners is most likely due to changes in sen-
tencing policies which have increased the probability of incarceration. Id. at 7.
Between 1980 and 1988 the number of prison commitments increased by 90%. Id
at 12. Moreover, between 1988 and 1991, the number of inmates incarcerated for
drug offenses nearly doubled. Luttrell, The Impact of the Sentencing Reform Act
on Prison Management, FED. PROBATION 54, 55 (December 1991).
5. BULLETIN ON PRISONERS, Supra note 3, at 1.
6. Id. The cost of constructing new prison facilities is enormous, and has been esti-
mated at an average of $26,000 per bed for minimum security prisons, $46,000 per
bed for medium security prisons, and $58,000 per bed for maximum security pris-
ons. C. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS, CONS AND PROS, 8 (1990).
The cost of operating prisons today is equally alarming. It is estimated the
annual cost of incarcerating a criminal is $17, 761. Lincoln Journal-Star, Jan. 5,
1991, at 2, col. 6. In Nebraska, the reported annual cost of incarcerating an adult
criminal ranges from $13,287 (Hastings Correctional Center) to $22,533 (Nebraska
Center for Women). NEBRASKA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, 16TH AN-
NUAL REPORT 20 (1989-90) [hereinafter DCS Annual Report].
7. BULLETIN ON PRISONERS, supra note 3, at 7. At the end of 1989, it was estimated
state and federal prisons were operating at somewhere between 10%-29% over
their capacities. Id.
8. Id. at 5. Despite the fact they are being called upon to ease overcrowding in state
and federal facilities, the nation's local jails are experiencing an overcrowding
problem of their own. In 1989 there were over 19 million jail admissions and
releases, and nationwide jail occupancy was 108% over capacity. BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN JAIL INMATES 1 (1989) [herein-
after BULLETIN ON JAILS]. In 1989 it was estimated one in every 469 adult
residents in the United States was in jail. Id.
9. LOGAN, supra note 6, at 8 (at least 42 states and the District of Columbia were
under court order to reduce prison overcrowding in 1987). See also Robbins,
Privatization of corrections: defining the issues, 69 JUDICATURE 325, 325 (1986).
At least one private prison firm has promised in a marketing brochure that con-
tracting for its services will reduce court pressure to reform and upgrade prison
facilities arguing that contracting for the services would demonstrate "good faith
effort" to comply with court orders to reduce overcrowding. Comment, Private
Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J. 253, 254-55 (1987).
10. Robbins, supra note 9, at 325. The increase in preventive detention, mandatory
sentencing, habitual-offender statutes and the abolition of parole in some juris-
dictions is evidence of public sentiment that more criminals should be incarcer-
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Nebraska's prison system has not remained unaffected by the re-
cent surge in prison population. Roughly one out of every thousand
Nebraskans is in prison,"X and all but one Nebraska adult prison facil-
ity is operating substantially over capacity.12 It is in this atmosphere
of overcrowding, court orders and strained budgets, that the concept
of privatization attracted the attention of state officials.' 3
ated and their sentences lengthened. Unfortunately, while the public insists on a
strong policy of incarceration it often refuses to support legislative attempts to
appropriate funds to pay for the onslaught of prisoners that result. See Folz &
Scheb, Prisons, Profits and Politics: The Tennessee Privatization Experiment, 73
JUDICATURE 98 (1989).
11. BULLETIN ON PRISONERS, supra note 3, at 2.
12. Nebraska's prison system is the seventh most overcrowded in the United States.
Lincoln Journal-Star, Nov. 9,1991, at 1, col. 1. DCS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 27-30, reports the following statistics:
Nebraska State Penitentiary
capacity: 488
population: 711
Lincoln Correctional Center
capacity: 468
population: 759
Omaha Correctional Center
capacity: 240
population: 349
OCC Work-Release Unit
capacity: 90
population: 100
Nebraska Center for Women
capacity: 84
population: 100
Hastings Correctional Center
capacity: 152
population: 147
13. Although private prison corporations have only recently emerged, the relation-
ship between the private sector and penal institutions exhibits a long and trou-
bled history. See, e.g., B. McKELvEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD
INTENTIONS, 94, 118, 199-203 (1977) (describing leasing of inmates to private parties
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
J. DiLuuo, Prisons, Profits, and the Public Good; The Privatization of Correc-
tions, (Criminal Justice Center, Sam Houston State University, 1 Research Bulle-
tin 1, 2-3 (1986)), states as recently as the latter half of this century several states
had privately-managed for-profit prisons. For example, in the late nineteenth
century Texas leased its prisoners to private individuals as laborers. Worked
mercilessly, many convicts committed suicide or maimed themselves in protest
and most convicts died within seven years of their incarceration. The Louisiana
penal system, prior to 1952, was used by public officials as a "patronage mill" and
contracts for inmate labor were awarded to friends, relatives and political sup-
porters. California's prison system began with a private contract which led to
abuses and resulted in the two-time dismissal of San Quentin's first warden. In
Michigan, Marquette prison was privatized in the 1920s but private involvement
ended when it became clear private managers were not interested in controlling
contraband.
Interestingly, it was not concern for the prisoners' welfare that motivated so-
ciety to abandon leasing of inmates for profit, but opposition from labor organiza-
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B. Privatization Defined
Privatization has been defined as a "fuzzy concept"'14 and indeed
has come to refer to a great range of ideas and policies. In the broad
sense, "privatization" is the process by which government-provided
functions and services are shifted from the public to the private sec-
tor.'5 In the area of corrections, "privatization" embraces a number of
concepts, from private prison industries,16 to contracting with private
suppliers for certain services such as medical care, psychiatric care,
educational and vocational services' 7, to private financing and con-
struction of new prison facilities.' 8 However, the concept of prison
tions which saw inmate labor as a threat to union jobs. Note, Making Prisons
Private: An Improper Delegation Of A Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV.
649, 652 (1987).
14. Starr, The Meaning ofPrivatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6 (1988).
15. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L.& POL'Y REV. 1, 1
(1988). Privatization in all areas is said to be on the rise. Between 1972 and 1982
the "total dollar amount of local government contract awards with private firms
[increased] from [approximately] $22 billion to $65 billion. [And] every indication
is that this number has continued to rise since 1982." DUDEK & COMPANY, PRIVA-
TIZATION AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: THE IMPACT OF CITY AND COUNTY CON-
TRACTING OUT ON GOVERNMENT WORKERs 8 (1988)(report for the National
Commission for Employment Policy).
16. Private prison industries, or "factories with fences" as Retired Chief Justice War-
ren Burger called them, seek to turn inmates into productive members of society
by having them work for a respectable wage producing goods that are sold in the
marketplace. See W. Burger, Remarks at the University of Nebraska, sponsored
by the Nebraska Bar Ass'n (Dec. 16, 1981), reprinted in W. Burger, More Ware-
houses, or Factories with Fences?, 8 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 111 (1982).
Nebraska has currently both a state-run prison industry (Cornhusker State
Industries) and a private prison industry (Private Venture Project) which is spon-
sored by the Private Sector/Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
of the United States Department of Justice. In the private program, inmates
work within the confines of the institution for a private company. Inmates are
paid with outside funds; a portion of their wages goes to the Nebraska Crime
Victim's Compensation Fund, to family support, restitution, room and board, and
state and federal taxes. See DCS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17-18.
17. The practice of contracting for professional prison services is quite common and
historically has sparked very little controversy. It is analytically distinguishable
from turning over the management of the entire prison facility to a private firm
in that contracting for professional services does not require the private firm to
actually administer punishment by restricting inmates' liberty.
18. Somewhat less drastic than total privatization, and much less controversial, is the
concept of contracting with private firms to construct new prison facilities which
will then be leased back or purchased by the state. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at
76-81. The traditional method of financing new prison construction is through
obligation bonds. Id. at 76. Private financing and construction presents an attrac-
tive alternative to legislators who are generally finding it difficult to obtain voter
support for the building of new facilities. Id. However, private construction is
open to political attack in that it allows state legislators to bypass public approval
for the building of new prison facilities. Id. at 77-78. Nonetheless, it is estimated
private companies can locate, finance, design and construct prisons more rapidly
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"privatization" that has spawned the most controversy refers to gov-
ernment contracting with a private firm for management of an entire
prison facility or prison system. It is this last concept of prison "priva-
tization," management of prison facilities by private for-profit firms,
which is the subject of this writing.
C. The Private Prison Debate
Prison privatization has generated an ongoing and often heated de-
bate.19 Proponents,20 who include not only some corrections profes-
sionals, but also major financial brokers who advise clients to invest in
private prison corporations, 21 argue government has done a dismal job
of running its prisons and jails.22 Proponents maintain that turning
prison operation over to the private sector will save taxpayer dollars
than can the government, and for about 80% of what the government pays for
construction. Id. at 79.
Even if one accepts that a private firm could finance and construct a new
prison more quickly and at less expense, perhaps it is more important to ask
whether the construction should have been undertaken in the first place. It has
been suggested the debate over private prison construction is best viewed as sec-
ondary to the ultimate question of whether we as a society NEED more jail space.
See Clkins, Privatization Of The American Prison System: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come?, 2 NoTRE DAIE J.L. ETmcs & PuB. PoL'Y 445, 461 (1986).
As mentioned earlier, the Standing Committee Amendments to LB 612 ex-
pressly provide for private "expansion, construction, or use of facilities" under
the jurisdiction of DCS. It remains unclear under present statutory bidding re-
quirements, set out in NEB. REv. STAT. section 83-916 (Reissue 1987), whether the
State of Nebraska could finance the construction of a new penal facility through a
lease-purchase agreement with a private corporation.
19. See, eg., Robbins & Cane, Should Prisons Be Privately Run? A.B.A. J., April 1,
1987, 38-39 (debating the issues of privatization).
20. The National Governor's Association adopted a resolution in 1985 declaring that
states should explore privatization yet cautioning such exploration should be ap-
proached with "great care and forethought" since "[t]he private sector must not
be viewed as an easy means for dealing with the difficult problem of prison over-
crowding." N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at 26, col. 3 § 1.
Another proponent of private prisons, the American Correctional Association,
has issued a policy advocating a careful examination of the issues and urging that
privatization should meet or exceed professional standards and be cost effective
when compared to well-managed governmental operations. American Correc-
tional Association, Ratified Correctional Public Policies (Jan. 20, 1985).
21. See Robbins, The Impact Of The Delegation Doctrine On Prison Privatization, 35
UCLA L. REV. 911, 912 (1988). It is estimated there is a $10 billion-a-year busi-
ness in incarcerating the nation's prisoners. Comment, supra note 9, at 254 (cit-
ing N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, at A31, col. 1).
22. "The perception that drives the proponents of privatization is that government
has become excessively entangled in businesses at which it is not particularly ef-
fective or efficient, thereby depleting the finite revenues in the public coffers, not
to mention the equally finite tolerance of the public itself for never-ending tax
increases or ever growing government budget deficits .... " Brakel, "Privatiza-
tion" in Corrections: Radical Prison Chic or Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEw
ENG. J. CRIM. & Civ. CoNINEMENT 1, 3 (1988).
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because if run as a profit-making business, prisons will be operated
more efficiently and at less cost to taxpayers. 23 Privatization has been
touted as a method of reducing both the size and scope of govern-
ment,2 4 and it is argued that with less bureaucracy and additional flex-
ibility, new correctional philosophies could be implemented quickly.25
Proponents of privatization insist chronic prison overcrowding could
be reduced through the private sector's ability to finance and build
new prisons with more bedspace. It has even been suggested that con-
tracting with private firms for the management of prisons will reduce
what some see as overly generous public employee pensions and bene-
fits, which burden taxpayers' pocket books.26
Opponents of prison privatization,2 7 who include the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Bar Association
(ABA), respond on many fronts. The ACLU, most noted for its efforts
to protect rights of individuals against encroachment by the state, re-
mains vehemently opposed to private prisons and has voiced concern
for protection of prisoners' rights, asserting such rights are more
likely to be violated in private for-profit prisons than in prisons run by
the government.28 In 1986, the ABA House of Delegates passed a reso-
23. See Priest, supra note 15, at 1 ("In many cases, government ends can be achieved
more effectively by the substitution of a profit motive for the amorphous motives
of a government bureaucracy.") It has been estimated that privatization can re-
duce the corrections tax bill by as much as 25%. See DILULO, supra note 13, at 2.
Others question predicted savings:
Closer examination reveals that some of the claims made by proponents
of privatization, particularly in the area of cost, may not be accurate and
have been proven wrong on at least two occasions. In 1984, Hamilton
County, Tennessee, turned over its jail to a private company in an effort
to save money. Due to unanticipated costs, the county wound up spend-
ing $200,000 more than it expected under its contract. In 1982, when a
private company took over the Okeechobee Reform School in Florida,
the company believed it could do a better job for less money. The com-
pany quickly discovered that in order to live up to its contract, it would
have to expend more money than the state had spent, not less."
Note, supra note 13, at 654-55 [citation omitted].
24. Comment, supra note 9, at 257.
25. Robbins, supra note 21, at 913.
26. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 41. At least one commentator has suggested prison
privatization is the "public sector analogue of the 'runaway shop'." Becker, With
Whose Hand Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 88 (1988). Becker argues the trend toward privatization amounts to a
deliberate labor relations strategy designed to cut labor costs by circumventing
public employees' rights.
27. Those who oppose prison privatization include the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the National Sheriffs' Associa-
tion, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Bar Ass'n
(ABA). See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 10.
28. Id- at 12. See also Cheever, Cells For Sale, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 1990, at 33, col. 2.
("The industry's opponents, including an unusual coalition of state corrections
officials, prisoners' rights groups and union leaders, say the introduction of the
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lution opposing prison privatization and recommending that "jurisdic-
tions that are considering the privatization of prisons and jails not
proceed... until the complex constitutional, statutory, and contrac-
tual issues are satisfactorily developed and resolved."29 Others are
concerned that operating prisons with a profit motive provides no in-
centive to reduce prison populations or explore alternatives to incar-
ceration.3 0 In fact, it is argued the incentive would be to build even
more prisons and jails.31
Foremost among concerns expressed by critics of privatization, and
those most often advanced in opposition to the idea, are questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of delegating the incarceration function
to private corporations, and the availability of section 1983 as a remedy
for violations of prisoners' rights by private correctional companies.3
2
The remainder of this Comment will focus briefly33 upon legal obsta-
profit motive into the system will tempt companies to cut costs at the inmates'
expense and may create conflict-of-interest problems between the business,
whose profits are tied directly to the number of inmates housed, and the govern-
ment's desire to rehabilitate and release its prisoners.")
29. See Robbins, supra note 2, at 536.
30. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 913 (private prison companies have no incentive to
reduce prison populations, especially if the company is paid on a per-prisoner
basis).
31. Id. Robbins warns that "if [the prisons] are built, we will fill them. This is a fact
of correctional life: the number of incarcerated criminals has always risen to fill
whatever space is available." Id-
32. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2; Thomas & Calvert Hanson, The Implications Of
42 U.S.C § 1983 For The Privatization Of Prisons, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 933
(1989); Robbins, supra note 21; Ellison, Privatization of Corrections: A Critique
And Analysis Of Contemporary Views, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 683 (1987); Note, supra
note 13; Comment, Prisons For Profit, 7 HAMiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 123 (1986).
Although critics of prison privatization have expressed concern over whether
those who operate private prisons will be subject to suit under section 1983 for
violations of prisoners' rights, the issue is fast becoming moot. Although beyond
the scope of this writing, commentators have been unanimous in concluding that,
despite the dearth of case law, actions of private prison operators will be consid-
ered "under color of state law" for purposes of section 1983. In addition to a
number of federal court decisions finding private contractors for prison services
to be acting under color of state law, see, for example, DeVargas v. Mason, 844
F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (1Uth
Cir. 1985); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982); Kelsey v.Ewing, 652
F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1981); Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42
(1988) that a private doctor's provision of medical services to inmates pursuant to
contract with the state constituted 'state action' and 'action under color of state
law' for purposes of section 1983. The West decision provides strong support for
the conclusion that the activities of a private prison constitute state action. For a
scholarly discussion of section 1983 litigation as it is affected by prison privatiza-
tion, see Robbins, supra note 2, at 577-612; Thomas & Calvert Hanson, supra.
33. The nondelegation doctrine is dealt with only briefly in this note, and is confined
primarily to Nebraska law. For a more extensive discussion of the nondelegation
doctrine (federal and national in scope) see Robbins, supra note 2, at 544-604.
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cles which may face prison privatization in Nebraska, then discuss pol-
icy issues raised by private prisons and the propriety of turning over to
the private sector the punishment of society's criminals.
III. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO PRIVATIZATION
A. Improper Delegation
The constitutionality of delegating to private corporations the au-
thority to incarcerate convicted criminals has been challenged by
many critics of prison privatization.34 There is not yet case law di-
rectly addressing the constitutionality of delegating provision of cor-
rections to the private sector35 but it is certain that if the prison
privatization movement is successful3 6 the constitutionality of private
incarceration facilities will ultimately be tested in the courts.
At the outset, it is important to note this section will not attempt a
comprehensive review of the history or present vitality of the nondele-
gation doctrine in federal and state courts.37 Suffice it to say that the
34. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 21, at 915-50; Note, supra note 13, at 656-60. Even
the ABA has questioned the constitutionality of delegating prison operation to
private corporations, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. The only case to date, filed by Tennessee inmates and state correctional employ-
ees seeking a declaration that the recently enacted statutes providing for private
prisons were unconstitutional, was dismissed for lack of standing because neither
the prison guards nor the inmates were employed or housed at the facility which
was subject to privatization. See Local 2173 Of The American Federation Of
State, County, And Municipal Employees v. McWherter, No. 87-34-II, 1987 WL
11762 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 1987).
36. Substantially more than half the states (at least 36) now contract with private
firms for the provision of at least one correctional service or program. J. DiLuLio,
PRIVATE PRISONS 1 (National Institute Of Justice, United States Department Of
Justice, April, 1988). The most frequent contracts are those for medical and psy-
chological services, community treatment centers, construction, education, drug
treatment, staff training and inmate counseling. Id
Some commentators have suggested that while privatization was gaining mo-
mentum in the early 1980s, by 1989 the movement that "promised so much had
delivered very little." Folz & Scheb, supra note 10 at 98-99, 73 JUDICATURE 98, 98-
99 (1989). However, the nation's biggest correctional corporation, Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) shows continuing growth (revenues up 79% for
the first half of 1990) and reports managing 5152 beds in 18 facilities nationwide.
CCA NEiWS RELEASE, March 16, 1990. CCA has the dubious distinction of con-
tracting with the U.S. Marshal's Service to operate the nation's first private maxi-
mum-security detention facility to be built in Leavenworth, Kansas. CCA
SECOND QUARTER REPORT, 1990.
37. The body of case law on the proper delegation of legislative authority is broad and
complex; I do not intend in this brief discussion to attempt a comprehensive anal-
ysis. The purpose of this section is merely to alert the reader to possible delega-
tion problems implicated by Nebraska's prison privatization bill (LB 612). See
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
For a thorough discussion of the development of the nondelegation doctrine in
the state and federal courts as it affects the government's ability to contract for
PRISON PRIVATIZATION
United States Supreme Court has not invalidated state legislation on
nondelegation grounds since 1936,38 and federal courts have accepted,
sometimes without comment, delegation of federal powers to private
actors.39 The nondelegation doctrine has developed differently in
state and federal courts,40 and while the doctrine appears to be alive
and well in state courts,41 commentators regard the development and
treatment of the doctrine at the state level as generally unprinci-
pled.42 Nondelegation will be discussed in this note only to the extent
it appears to pose an obstacle to. prison privatization in Nebraska.
While the Nebraska Constitution no where expressly prohibits the
legislature from vesting control of penal institutions in private hands,
a number of constitutional and statutory provisions suggest such a del-
egation would be improper.
Nebraska Constitution article IV, section 19 directs that the Legis-
lature is to determine who will manage and control the state's penal
institutions, providing that "[t]he general management, control and
government of all state charitable, mental, reformatory, and penal in-
private management of prisons, see Robbins, supra note 21, at 915-50. Robbins
notes although the nondelegation doctrine has not been employed by the
Supreme Court to invalidate a delegation in more than 50 years, I&L at 919, there
is some indication of renewed interest in the doctrine in dissenting and concur-
ring opinions. Robbins concludes it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court
would treat delegation in the prison context because incarceration of criminals
implicates life and liberty interests and the court may not apply principles an-
nounced in delegation cases which affected only property rights, making the
question of constitutionality extremely close. IM at 915.
38. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Supreme Court invalidated a
federal statute which made binding on all miners a maximum and minimum
wage agreed upon by a majority of miners. The court stated:
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested,
but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to
the interests of others .... And a statute which attempts to confer such
power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with
personal liberty and private property.
Id. at 311.
39. See Lawrence, Private Exercise Of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648
(1986).
40. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 914.
41. See D. MANDiELER, D. NETscH & P. SALsicH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
A FEDERAL SYSTEM 598 (2d ed. 1983), states:
The nondelegation doctrine is alive and well in the state courts. Delega-
tion of power objections are frequently made to state and local legisla-
tion, although a review of the state cases indicates that most delegations
are upheld. State delegation cases are common but the decisions are un-
principled. Except for the conclusion that some state courts more fre-
quently invalidate delegations of power than others, a principled basis
for the application of delegation of power doctrine is difficult to find.
42. See Lawrence, supra note 39, at 647 (noting that nondelegation cases are inconsis-
tent both within states and among states).
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
stitutions shall be vested as determined by the legislature."43
Pursuant to article IV, section 19, the Legislature has statutorily
vested control and management of all penal institutions in the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services, an independent agency of state govern-
ment established for custody of and control of sentenced criminals.44
The express legislative purpose behind the Act which created the De-
partment of Correctional Services was "to establish an agency of state
government for the custody, study, care, discipline, training, and treat-
ment of persons" 45 in correctional institutions. It is clear that, to al-
low for any entity other than the Department of Corrections to
maintain custody of convicted criminals, the present statutory scheme
must be amended. What is not clear is whether such amendments
could be made to harmonize with express legislative directives that
the "Department of Correctional Services shall have oversight and
general control of... all penal institutions."46
As originally introduced, LB 612 authorized the Director of the De-
partment of Correctional Services (DCS) to contract directly with pri-
vate parties for incarceration of those persons sentenced to serve time
in the custody of DCS. As such, the bill contemplated delegating to
the Director of DCS the power to determine who (in addition to DCS)
would manage and control a penal institution, a power expressly re-
served for the Legislature by article IV, section 19 of the Nebraska
Constitution. However, this deficiency was corrected when the bill
was amended to require the approval of the Legislature (and Gover-
nor) before allowing the director of DCS to enter into a contract for
the private custody and maintenance of prisoners.47
The primary delegation issue raised by prison privatization is the
constitutionality of delegating to a private corporation the authority to
manage and control a penal institution. The Nebraska Constitution,
statutes and case law suggest the punishment of society's criminals,
achieved through restriction of their liberty, is a function which must
be administered solely by the state.
Article XII, section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution provides in rel-
evant part:
No corporations -shall be created by special law, nor their charters be ex-
tended, changed or amended, except those corporations organized for ... pe-
nal or reformatory purposes, which are to be and remain under the patronage
and control of the state.4 8
Thus, the Nebraska Constitution directs that if the legislature creates
43. NEB. CONST. ART. IV, § 19.
44. See NEa. REv. STAT. §§ 83-171, 83-901 (Reissue 1987).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-901 (Reissue 1987)(emphasis added).
46. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-906 (Reissue 1987).
47. See supm note 1.
48. NEB. CONST. ART. XII, 1.
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a corporation for penal or reformatory purposes, such corporation is to
remain under the control and patronage of the state. Clearly, private
prison legislation is not an attempt to create a corporation but rather
empowers the state to contract with an existing private-sector correc-
tions firm for incarceration of state prisoners. Nonetheless, article
XII, section 1 stands as a clear policy statement that those corpora-
tions which exercise penal or reformatory functions are to be and re-
main under the control and the patronage of the state.49 To the extent
legislation is passed allowing private correctional firms to operate
prison facilities outside the exclusive control of the state, such legisla-
tion may well contravene public policy concerns underlying article
XII, section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution.
Further indicating that public policy requires the administration of
punishment to remain solely with the state, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has held unconstitutional a statute which had the effect of dele-
gating to private persons the punishment to be assessed for a crime.50
In State v. Goodseal,51 the court determined the Nebraska Self De-
fense Act52 was an unconstitutional delegation of power to private
persons because the Act did not fix the amount of force which could
be exercised when resorting to justifiable self-defense, and thus had
the effect of delegating to those asserting self-defense the power to
determine the proper amount of force to be used.S3 The court
explained:
[T]he Legislature has delegated the fixing of the punishment to the person
asserting self-defense which it cannot do.... Any attempt to delegate... such
powers to private persons with the excesses that naturally flow when crime or
punishment are placed elsewhere than with the state, is violative of the powers
placed exclusively with the Legislature by our state Constitution. 4
Admittedly, private prison legislation does not delegate to private
persons the authority to affi a punishment; however such legislation
does delegate authority to administer court-ordered punishment by
restricting the liberty of convicted criminals. The concern expressed
in Goodseal with "excesses" that naturally flow when punishment is
placed "elsewhere than with the state" is equally, if not more,5 5 justi-
fied in the private prison context, and strongly suggests public policy
49. Id. "Patronage" is defined as: "the control of or power to make appointments to
government jobs or the power to grant other political favors". THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1058 (1981). It is clear a private
prison corporation under contract to manage and control a prison facility is not
under the "patronage" of the state, because, among other things, the state does
not have power to appoint those who work for the private company.
50. State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 183 N.W.2d 258 (1971).
51. Id.
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-114 (1969)(repealed 1971).
53. State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. at 367, 183 N.W.2d at 263.
54. Id. at 367-68, 183 N.W.2d at 263 (emphasis added).
55. See supra note 13.
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concerns require the punishment of society's criminals be adminis-
tered solely by the state.
Despite the Nebraska Supreme Court's general distaste for dele-
gating the administration of punishment to private persons, there is
case-law support for the proposition that contracting with the private-
sector to fulfill a governmental duty does not, in all instances, offend
the Nebraska Constitution. In State ex rel. Creighton University v.
Smith,56 the Nebraska Supreme Court held: "The Nebraska Constitu-
tion does not prohibit the state from doing business or contracting
with private institutions in fulfilling a governmental duty and further-
ing a public purpose." At first blush, this language appears to end the
inquiry into whether private prisons are constitutionally permissible
in Nebraska, as the management of prisons is undoubtedly a govern-
mental duty which furthers a public purpose. However, because
Creighton v. Smith dealt only with the propriety of legislative appro-
priations to a private university, the holding may well be too narrow to
have any applicability in the private prison context.
In Creighton, the court dealt with article VII, section 11 of the Ne-
braska Constitution, which provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision in the constitution, appropriation of pub-
lic funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning not owned
or exclusively controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof .... 57
The court determined article VII, section 11 did not prohibit the
state from contracting with a private university for purposes of con-
ducting cancer research,58 reasoning that payments for contracted
services did not amount to appropriating public funds to a private
school, and as such did not violate the constitutional prohibition
against such appropriations.5 9
The conclusional language in Creighton ought not quell doubts sur-
rounding the constitutionality of contracting with the private sector
for the incarceration of state prisoners since the court in Creighton did
not confront the propriety of delegating a traditional governmental
function to a private party. In fact, the court was not required to ad-
dress delegation at all. Rather, the court considered whether pay-
ments made under a contract between the government and a private
institution amounted to appropriating public funds to a private
institution.60
56. 217 Neb. 682, 689, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272 (1984).
57. NEB. CONST. art VII, § 11.
58. State ex reL Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 683-84, 353 N.W.2d 267, 269
(1984).
59. I& at 690, 353 N.W.2d at 269.
60. There is a discernable difference between government contracting for private
cancer research and contracting for private incarceration of state prisoners.
While both further a public purpose, cancer research is by no means a function
which historically has been performed by the state, and therefore simply fails to
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While a perfunctory recitation of the language in Creighton would
seem to provide support for the conclusion that private prisons are
constitutionally permissible in Nebraska, such a conclusion might well
be "misplaced. Incarceration of criminals implicates fundamental life
and liberty interests, and, if called upon to consider the propriety of
private incarceration, the Nebraska Supreme Court may be unwilling
to apply principles announced in a case addressing only the propriety
of legislative appropriations to a private university for cancer
research.
In short, private prison legislation in Nebraska is constitutionally
suspect on a number of grounds. Not only is it subject to criticism as
constituting an improper delegation of authority to administer court-
ordered punishment, it may also be attacked as contravening express
public policy by delegating an inherently governmental function, the
incarceration of society's criminals, to private parties.
Even a finding that prison privatization does not offend the Ne-
braska Constitution should by no means be interpreted as an indica-
tion that it is wise to transfer the administration of punishment to
private hands.61 As one commentator concluded: just as the prisoner
should be obliged to know day by day, minute by minute he is in the
custody of the state, perhaps too the state should be obligated to know
that it alone is its brothers' keeper.62
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
A. Will Private Prisons Save Taxpayers Money?
The most frequent, and possibly the most salient, claim made by
proponents of prison privatization is that private prisons will be more
efficient and less expensive, thereby saving taxpayers money.6 3 While
there is a dearth of empirical data with which to support or refute this
claim, even staunch supporters of privatization admit private prisons
will not necessarily save taxpayers money or be less expensive to oper-
ate than prisons run by government. 64
The costs involved in corrections are relatively fixed.65 Inmates
must be housed, fed and provided with appropriate medical care;
guards must be trained and equipped; prison facilities must be main-
raise the same delegation concerns as contracting for the private incarceration of
prisoners. In fact, unlike incarceration, cancer research is something the state
generally is ill-equipped to perform, making private contracts for such research
something of a necessity.
61. See Part IV infra.
62. Robbins, supra note 9, at 331.
63. See LOGAN, supra, note 6, at 76.
64. See, e.g., LOGAN, supra note 6, at 117 ("Private prisons will not necessarily be less
expensive than those owned and run directly by the government.")
65. See Dilulio, supra note 13, at 3.
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tained and kept extraordinarily secure.66 Many have commented that
the tasks involved in corrections do not appear to be the type that al-
low for major innovations in technique, leaving little room for cost
savings through improved efficiency.6 7 In fact, because labor costs
generally represent more than 60% of a prison's operating budget,
some suggest that, in order to turn a profit, staff in private prisons
must be cut dramatically.68
In practice, the switch to private prisons has proven less costly for
some69 and more costly for others70. Examples of cost savings and cost
overruns in both public and private prisons make it exceedingly clear
that the performance of public prisons has not been invariably bad,
and the performance of privately-run prisons has not been invariably
good. At best, the public should remain skeptical of claims that pri-
vate prisons will save taxpayers money. What data there is provides
absolutely no basis from which to conclude private prisons will oper-
ate any more efficiently or at any lower cost to taxpayers than public
prisons.
66. Id.
67. See Dilulio, supra note 13, at 3; Privatization Of Corrections: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1985)(statement of
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees):
Different correctional systems over the past decade have tapped every
available source of correctional expertise, as well as the management
skills of prestigious accounting firms and consulting sources like the
Wharton School of Business to streamline manning rosters, limit posts,
and contain overtime. All for naught. The fundamental business of cor-
rections is supervision. Technical gadgetry and computerized scheduling
have done little to lower the cost of such supervision.
68. See Cheever, Cells For Sale, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 1990 at 33, col. 2.
69. Some Immigration and Naturalization Service facilities have proven less costly in
private hands, with savings cited from 6% to 72%. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 93.
Santa Fe County, New Mexico saved 52% in 1987 after contracting with a private
corrections corporation to run its jail. The savings were attributed to better use
of the facility (the private firm leased unused space in the large jail facility to
other jurisdictions). Id. Bay County Jail in Florida reported a 12% savings after
going private. Id. Butler County Prison saved 5%--10% when it was privatized;
savings were attributed to reduced overhead as the result of eliminating of 15
employees. Id.
70. Although some privatized Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) facili-
ties reported savings, the per diem cost of operating INS facilities was actually
lower for those INS facilities operated by the federal government. Id. at 95-96.
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported it cost 40% more to house
Youth Corrections Act offenders in the privately-operated facility than in its
three public facilities. Id. at 96. In 1985, Alabama decided not to contract with
private prison operators after a study of Florida's privately-managed youth facil-
ity concluded that "privatization of correctional facilities in Alabama would sig-
nificantly raise costs, not reduce them." Id.
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B. Dependency on Private Prison Providers
Even more discouraging than unpredictable cost savings is the pos-
sibility that a private prison firm will obtain contracts by "low balling"
to procure a contract, and then operate the facility at a loss for a few
years in order to establish governmental dependence on the private
sector.7 ' Once dependency is established, the private firm is free to
recover losses through cost overruns and increased charges72.
Those who doubt the extent to which a private contractor for pub-
lic services can successfully overrun costs, need only look as far as to-
day's headlines for proof such overruns regularly occur. 73 The
defense industry, notorious for budget overruns, recently cancelled
development of the A-12 aircraft; the project was eighteen months be-
hind schedule and $1 billion over the contractually-fixed budget.74
Proponents of prison privatization respond to the issue of eventual
dependency and potential cost overruns by pointing out that, if a pri-
vate provider has performed unsatisfactorily or privatization becomes
overly expensive, government is free to cancel the private prison con-
tract when renewal time rolls around.7s Such a response ignores the
realities of corrections and illuminates the numerous logistical
problems raised by cancellation of a private prison contract. For in-
stance, who maintains custody and control of inmates while the state
switches from one private prison operator to another? What if, as a
result of dependency upon a private provider, the state no longer has
capacity to hold and care for prisoners? What if, due to the state's
obviously inferior bargaining position (too many prisoners and no
prison guards), it is unable to secure a contract with another private
correctional firm for a reasonable fee? What does the state do with
inmates if the prison facility is not only operated but also owned by
the private prison corporation with which the state has canceled its
contract? In short, the logistical nightmare of switching private prison
71. The National Law Journal explains that private prison firms have been operating
at a loss amounting to millions of dollars, and are expected to increase their rates
dramatically once states get accustomed to having private firms handle the over-
crowding crisis. Cheever, Cells For Sale, NATm' L.J. Feb. 19, 1990 at 33, col. 2.
72. See Porter, The Privatisation of Prisons in the United States: A Policy 'hat Great
Britain Should Not Emulate, 29 How. J. CRinm. JusT. 65, 76 (1990)(reporting Brit-
ish study of U.S. private prisons concluded "Private companies are not, at the
present time making profits from privatisation . . . they are clearly in a "loss
leader" situation.... The object appears to be to establish the respective state's
dependence on the private sector and then to increase charges.") See also supra
note 23 (citing two examples of cost overruns by private correctional firms).
73. See Vartbedian and Broder, Defense industry in shambles, Lincoln Journal-Star,
Jan. 9, 1991, at 2, col. 1; A-12 erased contractors stunned, Lincoln Journal-Star,
Jan. 8,1991, at 3, col. 4 (outlining the abuses and enormous budget overruns in the
defense industry).
74. Lincoln Journal-Star, Jan. 8, 1991, supra note 72.
75. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 221-29.
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operators midstream, not to mention the cost of such a switch, may
discourage conscientious contract enforcement and encourage states to
renew contracts with private prison corporations in spite of significant
cost increases.
To the extent dependency on private prison operators does occur,
and even supporters of prison privatization concede the possibility,76
concerns about private operators going bankrupt become very real.77
Perhaps even more worrisome is the realization that, even if the pri-
vate firm never files bankruptcy, the company could effectively use
the threat of bankruptcy to gain governmental concessions. Also
troublesome is the fact that if bankruptcy is filed, the "automatic stay"
provision7 8 would prevent inmates from filing lawsuits against the
debtor-company and would stay any such suits already instituted at
the time of the bankruptcy filing, effectively foreclosing inmate reme-
dies against the private company for civil rights violations.
Prison operation is not a short-term business. Privatization of
prison facilities generates reliance on the private sector which not
only weakens the government's bargaining position in subsequent ne-
gotiations, but threatens public coffers by making it impractical to
sever the relationship with the private provider in the event privatiza-
tion proves more costly than publicly-operated facilities.
C. The Profit Motive
Doubtless there is money to be made from the incarceration of the
nation's criminals-roughly $10 billion dollars worth79. The nation's
biggest private prison contractor, Corrections Corporation of America
(operating twenty-one facilities nationwide)80, reports an expected an-
nual revenue of $4 million dollars from a 256-bed minimum-security
76. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 229: "It is not inevitable that the government will
become dependent on contractors ... but it can happen."
77. See Cheever, Cells For Sale, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 1990 at 33, col. 1 (expressing
concern over prisoners' fate should a private prison file bankruptcy). See also In
re A & D Care, Inc., 90 B.R. 138 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1988)(In that case, the private
prison contractor of a minimum security prison facility in Pennsylvania filed
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy court permissively abstained on grounds that the
propriety of private prisons had not been litigated in Pennsylvania courts nor had
the question of delegation of authority to parties other than the prison board been
litigated and it was not certain what result would be reached by the state
supreme court.); Coughlin, THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, DOES CRIME PAY?
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (1985) p.32.
Coughlin reports that in 1978, the New York Department of Mental Retardation
contracted with a private agency to run a substantial part of a large facility.
Three years later the company was $17 million in debt and filed bankruptcy.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1991)
79. Comment, supra note 9, at 254. See also Private prisons record most profitable
year, Lincoln Journal, Mar. 30, 1992, at 16, col. 1.
80. CCA NEws RELEASE, Oct. 8, 1990.
[Vol. 70:900
PRISON PRIVATIZATION
facility in Mason, Tennessee,8 in excess of $5 million annually from a
610-bed medium-security facility in Winnfield, Louisiana,8 2 and more
than $6 million annually from a 640-bed medium-security facility in
Nashville, Tennessee.8 3
While the motivation of those who punish may be irrelevant to the
effectiveness of the punishment8 4, the profit motive is certain to have
an effect on both the cost and quality of incarceration as well as the
rate at which we as a society incarcerate those who violate our laws.
Although it has been suggested the negative response to private pris-
ons stems more from a growing distaste for incarceration than from
disapproval of the profit motive8 5, many opponents of private prisons
are concerned private prison companies are "more interested in doing
well than doing good."86 Fueling that concern are statements like the
following, made by a private prison official: "We'll hopefully make a
buck at it. I'm not going to kid any of you and say that we're in this for
humanitarian reasons."8 7 While the honesty of the statement is to be
admired, the unseemliness of profiting from punishment is difficult to
shake-and perhaps with good reason.
Incentives created by for-profit prisons are not necessarily compat-
ible with furthering sound correctional policy or the public interest.
For example, operating prisons with a profit motive creates no incen-
tive to reduce overcrowding, especially if prison contractors are paid,
as they often are, on a per-prisoner basis.88 Private prison contractors
have a vested interest in assuring there are plenty of prisoners to
house. Such an interest leads to concerns that, in the interest of
profit, a private prison lobby will launch and support campaigns
designed to make a public which is already in favor of more and longer
sentences even more fearful of crime.8 9
Of additional concern to those who oppose privatization is the pos-
sibility that, in the interest of profit, private prison operators will cut
costs at the expense of humane treatment, carefully keeping condi-
tions of confinement to only the minimal standards required by law.
81. CCA NEws RELEASE, Mar. 16, 1990.
82. CCA NEws RELEASE, Feb. 22, 1990.
83. CCA NEWS RELEASE, Oct. 8, 1990.
84. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 71-72 ("Strictly speaking, the motivation of those who
apply a punishment is not relevant either to the justice or to the effectiveness of
the punishment.").
85. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 72.
86. Robbins, supra note 9, at 326.
87. Robbins & Crane, supra note 19, at 38.
88. See Comment, supra note 9, at 259.
89. Proponents of prison privatization have responded to the lobbying concern with a
casual "so what?," arguing that even if such lobbying took place it would do noth-
ing more than demonstrate responsiveness to the public's demand for more and
longer sentences. See, e.g., Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV.
889, 898 (1987).
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While it is true private prison operators will be concerned about up-
holding contractual requirements and maintaining constitutional con-
ditions to avoid expensive inmate litigation, there are an endless
number of potential savings for the entrepreneur seeking to reduce
marginal costs and increase profits, many of which would be ex-
tremely difficult to observe and monitor in a private facility where
public access is limited and visibility reduced. Fear that those who
operate private prisons are motivated only by profit and lack concern
for inmates' well-being is accentuated by proposals, like one made by a
private firm in Pennsylvania, to build a 720-bed medium-security facil-
ity on a toxic-waste site that had been purchased for one dollar.90
The profit motive may also be incompatible with the laudable goal
of decreasing recidivism. Is a "successful" private prison one that is
always full, or one that is empty? If a successful prison is an empty
prison, then private prisons would be in the paradoxical position of
constantly striving to put themselves out of business9l. Such is un-
likely to be the case because, after all, private prison corporations
must answer to investors. Full prisons translate into good invest-
ments; the pertinent question, however, is for whom?92
D. Increased Reliance on Incarceration
The United States has the dubious distinction of being the number
one incarcerator in the world, with a larger share of its population
behind bars than any other country.93 Nationwide, per capita spend-
ing on incarceration at state and local levels has grown faster in the
past twenty-five years than government spending in most other areas,
including public welfare, health care, police, and not surprisingly, edu-
cation94 . The United States Sentencing Commission projects new sen-
tencing guidelines and tougher penalties for drug-law violations will
result in a 119% increase in the federal prison population by 1997.95 In
light of the rate at which we as a country incarcerate and the amount
of money we spend doing so, the concept of prison privatization should
90. See Levine, Private Prison Planned on Toxic Waste Site, NAT'L PRISON PROJECT
JOURNAL, 10, 11 (1985).
91. See Borna, Free Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 321, 324
(1986).
92. It is interesting to note that as incarceration rates have increased in Nebraska, so
has the rate of recidivism. See NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERV-
ICES ADULT STATISTICAL REPORT 1, 102 (1990). While this is not necessarily indic-
ative of an empirical relationship between incarceration and recidivism, it does
raise questions about the ultimate effect on society of incarcerating so many of-
fenders, rather than utilizing alternative forms of punishment.
93. U.S. Imprisonment Rate Is Highest In World, Lincoln Journal-Star, Jan. 5,1991,
at 2, col. 3. The United States incarcerates more criminals than either the Soviet
Union and South Africa. Id
94. See LOGAN, supra, note 6, at 9.
95. Lincoln Journal-Star, supra note 93, at col. 5.
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not be judged without also exploring its impact on public willingness
to utilize sentencing alternatives.
While incarceration effectively incapacitates would-be offenders, 96
it is by far the most expensive form of punishment both from a finan-
cial and social standpoint. Americans pay more than $17 million a day
to operate prison facilities, with estimates ranging up to $60 a day per
inmate.97 Incarceration has high social costs not only to offenders who
are separated from their families and jobs, but also to the public wel-
fare system which is called upon to support dependents of those who
are incarcerated. The rehabilitative potential of incarceration has
proven weak,98 and the same sentencing policies which have served to
make us the world's leading incarcerator have also failed to make us a
safer nation.99 One must question, in light of these statistics, the wis-
dom of continuing to rely so heavily upon imprisonment as the punish-
ment of choice.
The prison privatization industry is driven by profit and an admit-
ted desire to further expand its operations. 00 By its very nature,
prison privatization increases reliance on incarceration by providing
more prison bedspace and making it feasible to incarcerate more
criminals. To the extent society continues to rely on incarceration,
and privatization serves only to increase that reliance, it fails to utilize
sentencing alternatives which are less expensive,' 0 ' and perhaps more
effective than traditional incarceration.102
It goes almost without saying that the clamor for privatization
96. See Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime ControL" Possibilities and Pit-
falls, 5 CRIME AND JUSTICE AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (1983).
97. See Robbins, supra note 9, at 325.
98. In a 1981 address at the University of Nebraska entitled More Warehouses, or
Factories with Fences?, Warren E. Burger suggested too many prisons serve only
as human "warehouses" which make a high rate of recidivism inevitable. See
supra note 16 at 111, 114-15. See also supra note 91.
Rep. John Conyers of Michigan, chairman of the House Government Opera-
tions Committee, stated: "We've got to stop jailing and start rehabilitating ....
We can build all the jails we think we need and slam the doors down on
thousands of people, but it won't make a bit of difference until we address the
fundamental causes of-crime." Lincoln Journal-Star, supra note 92, at col. 4.
99. See Lincoln Journal-Star, supra note 93, at col. 4.
100. In its 1989 Annual Report, the Correction Corporation Of America makes an omi-
nous statement: "Doubling our beds is there for us to accomplish." CCA 1989
ANNUAL REPORT 9.
101. For example, the average cost per day of incarcerating an offender in Nebraska is
$44.74, while the average cost per day for placing an offender on probation is
$1.04. NEBRASKA JUSTICE FELLowsHP FACT SHEET (compiled with information
from DCS). While it costs nearly $15,400 a year to incarcerate a prisoner in the
Omaha Correctional Center, it costs only $9190 to house a prisoner in the Omaha
Correctional Center Work-Release Unit. DCS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
29. See also Lincoln Journal-Star, supra note 93, at col. 6 ("Alternative punish-
ments are less costly than imprisonment.").
102. See Porter, supra note 71, at 77 ("[Privatization] is a distraction from what should
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would subside if the nation's reliance on incarceration decreased.
With the number of criminals incarcerated continually on the rise, it
may be that the real solution to the present prison crisis does not lie in
the privatization of corrections, but in rethinking our entire approach
to punishment. By its very nature, prison privatization is inconsistent
with such a solution.10 3
V. CONCERNS OF IDEOLOGY AND PROPRIETY
While the focus thus far has been on the questionable constitution-
ality of prison privatization and some of the policy problems it
presents, this section explores briefly the philosophical concerns un-
derlying prison privatization. Philosophical concerns often go unad-
dressed in the privatization debate, yet they likely contribute to the
general uneasiness which surrounds the prospect of placing custody
and control of prisoners in private hands. Even if, contrary to the ear-
lier discussion, private prisons could operate at substantial savings to
the public without compromising prisoner's rights or correctional
goals, one must still ask whether private prisons are proper or desira-
ble as a matter of principle.
It has been said it is less difficult to persuade people that prison
privatization is philosophically wrong than to first persuade them such
philosophical questions have any place in the privatization debate at
all.1o4 Many simply reject the importance of philosophy and ideology,
believing such exercises are best left to those who exist in academia
rather than reality. The prison privatization debate, however, ought
not take place outside the realm of principle, for central to the debate
itself are questions of where government gets the power to punish and
whether punishment is legitimate when exercised by an entity other
than government.
John Locke posited that, in the state of nature, individuals have
the inherent right to punish their aggressors.105 Because disagree-
ments occur over interpretation and application of natural law,106 peo-
ple 'contract' to form a state, thereby turning over to the state their
be the main focus of reform in the British and American criminal justice systems.
This focus should seek alternatives to incarceration as a form of punishment.").
103. IL ("The relatively high rates of imprisonment... have already been mentioned,
and the creation of increased capacity may be seen as a discouragement to finding
alternatives to incarceration.").
104. Dilulio, supra note 13, at 4.
105. JOHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Chapter II, 5-6 (J.W.
Cough ed. 3d ed. 1966). Locke explains that in the state of nature, "every man
hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature." I&
at 6. See also LOGAN, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing Locke's contract theory).
106. "[T]he end of civil society [is] to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of the
state of nature which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own
case .... ." J. LOCKE, supra note 105, at 45.
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inherent power to create and enforce rules in return for the state's
promise of protection.107 Under this social contract theory,10s mem-
bers of society agree to accept the laws of the state and allow the state
to punish them for violations.
The power of punishment, therefore, has been placed in the hands
of the state through social contract, and once an entity other than the
state seeks to punish for an offense, the social contract is violated.109
To remain legitimate, the power to administer punishment and
thereby restrict the liberty of those who violate society's laws must
remain solely in the hands of public authorities.110
Interestingly, although the profit motive has relevance when dis-
cussing the wisdom of prison privatization, it is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether private prisons are proper in principle. Philosophical
questions of whether it is proper for government to delegate the ad-
ministration of punishment to the private sector do not turn on
whether those who administer punishment ought to profit therefrom.
Accordingly, even if a private prison corporation were to offer its serv-
ices for free, the philosophical case against prison privatization would
remain unaltered."'l
The creation and enforcement of laws and the punishment of those
who violate the law are perhaps the primary raisons d'etre of govern-
ment.112 Simply put, it is philosophically improper for government to
abdicate its fundamental responsibility, the administration of justice,
to private parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Privatization is an issue which has energed in part because we, as a
society, continue to demand that more criminals be incarcerated and
their sentences be lengthened, while simultaneously refusing to sup-
port legislative attempts to appropriate funds to provide for the result-
107. Locke states: "And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of
it, committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making
laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its mem-
bers .... " J. LOCKE, supra note 105, at 44.
108. See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SoCIAL. CONTRACT (M. Cranston trans. 1968).
109. As Locke explains, the legislature can not transfer the power of making and en-
forcing laws "to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the
people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others." J. LOCKE, supra note 105,
at 72. See also NEB. CONST. ART. I SEC. 1, providing in relevant part that to secure
the rights enumerated in article I section 1, "governments are instituted among
people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
110. See Dilulio, supra note 13, at 5.
111. I&
112. See Cikins, supra note 18, at 458 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS 72 (1985)).
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ing onslaught of prisoners.1' 3  Unfortunately, our reliance on
incarceration is unlikely to diminish in the near future, and our prison
system is in a state of crisis. While the clamor for privatization dem-
onstrates an awareness that conditions in the nation's prisons are un-
acceptable, it is imperative that prison privatization not be
misunderstood as prison reform.
Prison privatization, with its questionable constitutionality and dif-
ficult policy problems, will not reform our troubled prisons. With
numbers of incarcerated criminals increasing annually, solutions to
the prison crisis lie not in privatization of corrections, but in rethink-
ing our entire approach to punishment. Relinquishing management of
our prisons to the private sector is not only unwise and improper, but
it serves to mask the true source of the crisis-which is not overcrowd-
ing, but overreliance on incarceration.
Stephanie Frazier Stacy '91
113. See supm note 10.
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